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ABSTRACT
No consensus exists regarding the proper income tax treatment 
of gifts. Some commentators believe the tax should fall on the donor 
only; others believe it should fall on the donee only; and still others 
believe it should fall on both the donor and the donee.
Although much of the disagreement appears to center on the 
proper definition of “income,” this Article argues that the problem 
lies elsewhere. There is no readily identifiable, correct definition of 
“income,” which means that most arguments tying the income tax 
treatment of gifts to the income concept tend to be definitional and, 
for that reason, circular. In fact, what motivates most theories about 
the proper income tax regime for gifts is a prior view about the 
nature and purpose of government coupled with a theory of how the 
tax system should best promote that view. Commentators debating 
the rules for the income taxation of gifts rarely argue explicitly about 
their prior views, however, and it is not clear whether, if they did, 
they would be able to resolve their differences. Accordingly, the 
debate over the proper income taxation of gifts is in some measure a 
pseudo-debate.
Problems with efforts to derive normative propositions about 
taxation from the definition of the tax base are not unique to the gift 
case; they extend to other debates as well. The analysis therefore has 
relevance to normative tax scholarship more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
It is perhaps surprising that no consensus exists regarding the 
proper income tax treatment of the following transaction: A makes a 
cash gift to B.1 Since the inception of the modern income tax, the 
rule has been that A is taxed (by means of the denial of a deduction 
for the gift), while B is not,2 but tax scholars frequently have 
1. A related set of issues concerns whether a transfer for less than full 
consideration is a gift in certain borderline situations, such as non-obligatory 
transfers from service recipients to service providers. This set of issues has also 
generated a large body of case law and scholarship, but it is not the focus of the 
present discussion, which assumes the transfer is unambiguously a gift and asks 
what the income tax regime for such a transfer should be. For commentary and 
authority on the issue of what does or should constitute a gift, see Douglas A. Kahn, 
The Taxation of a Gift or Inheritance from an Employer, 64 TAX LAW. 273, 273-74
(2011), and authorities cited therein; William A. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal 
Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word “Gift,” 48 MINN. L. REV. 215, 215-23
(1963), and authorities cited therein.
2. 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). (Henceforth, all statutory citations are to 
Title 26 of the U.S. Code, the “Internal Revenue Code of 1986” as amended.) A 
largely opposite regime applies to built-in gain or loss on gifted property: The donor 
is not taxed on the gain, but the donee is, albeit not until the property is disposed of 
in a taxable transaction. See § 1015(a)(1) (carryover basis to donee for appreciated 
gifts); § 1001(a) (gain (loss) realized equals the difference between the amount 
realized (seller’s adjusted basis) and the seller’s adjusted basis (amount realized)). 
The special features for taxation of built-in-gain seem to relate to practical questions 
about the optimal taxpayer given that Congress has chosen to tax just one party; they 
do not seem to relate to a different normative theory about who should bear the tax 
in the case of such gain.
A separate gift tax applies to donors on certain gifts, but the gift tax is a 
part of the federal transfer tax regime, which comprises the estate tax, the 
“generation-skipping tax,” and the gift tax, not of the income tax. See § 2501; see 
generally §§ 2101-2664. In addition, the income tax provides a deduction for certain 
charitable gifts, but for policy reasons not entirely related to the concept of the 
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disagreed about whether that is the right rule. Some believe it is,3
others have argued it is backwards,4 and still others have said it goes 
only halfway: Donors should not enjoy a deduction for gifts they 
make, but donees should be taxed on gifts they receive.5
Disagreement among proponents of the various views often has 
centered on the meaning of the term “income,”6 but the long history 
of contention over the question suggests the problem lies elsewhere. 
This Article argues that the disagreement is properly traceable to 
conflicting and to some extent irresolvable philosophical 
commitments that proponents of the various positions have adopted; 
it does not have to do with determining the correct definition of 
“income,” an enterprise that is probably doomed to failure anyway. 
The argument implies that disagreements over the income concept as 
it relates to gifts tend to be semantic. Stated otherwise, the debate has 
in some measure operated at the level of competing tautologies.
As an example, if one believes income to be a proxy for well-
being or utility (sometimes generally referred to in this Article as 
“welfare”), taxation of both parties could follow, as could relatively 
lighter taxation for gifts, depending on the extent of the 
government’s interest in using tax rules to promote certain behavior 
proper measurement of income. See § 170. See generally John D. Colombo, The 
Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating 
Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 659, 
659 n.11 (2001). This Article addresses neither the transfer taxes applicable to 
certain gifts nor the policies that underlie the deduction under section 170.
3. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and 
Gefts”—The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable 
“Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 483 (2003).
4. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 309, 348 (1972).
5. Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts 
and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1978); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of 
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1992); Lawrence Zelenak, Commentary: The Reasons 
for a Consumption Tax and the Tax Treatment of Gifts and Bequests, 51 TAX L.
REV. 601, 601 (1996). As far as I am aware, no one has explicitly argued for the 
fourth possibility: deduction to donor and exclusion for donee, but welfare-type 
arguments could support such a regime or something similar, such as reduced rates 
on gifts. See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 5, at 1182-83 (treating as income the 
taxpayer’s ability, relative to other taxpayers, to pay for public goods); see Kahn & 
Kahn, supra note 3, at 454 (treating as income the taxpayer’s right to determine the 
preclusive use of resources produced through economic activity); Kornhauser, supra
note 5, at 32 (treating as income the right to affect consumption).
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as well as on the actual facts of the case. Conversely, if one begins 
with a definition of income that limits it to something like command 
over resources or ability, where “ability” means capacity in resources 
the government itself can use, taxation of just one of the parties to 
the transaction likely would follow, albeit with disagreement over 
whom. Those who identify income with resources produced through 
economic activity generally consider the donor to be the proper 
taxpayer,7 while those who identify income with ownership of a 
portion of such resources generally consider the donee to be the 
proper taxpayer.8 (An intermediate rule that taxes both parties to the 
same total extent but only on a share of the total gift also is possible.) 
In either case, however, there is no way to adjudicate between the 
two positions without also engaging the question of whether one 
ought to consider income a proxy for welfare, or a concept reflecting 
a measure of control over usable resources, or as implementing some 
other ideal. In short, nothing will be settled by trying to derive the 
correct tax rule for gifts from the definition of “income” without also 
having informed that definition by means of a theory of social and 
political obligation.
Two of this Article’s ambitions are to show how the debates as 
they have evolved relate to the more foundational philosophical 
questions described above and to clarify the implications of several 
of the various views for the income taxation of gifts. I do not take a 
position on which view is correct. Instead, I conclude that any of a 
number of possible regimes, including the regime in effect, are 
equally reasonable, depending on what one takes to be the purpose of 
the tax system. What I hope to show is that much of the apparent 
disagreement about the proper taxation of gifts is really disagreement 
over other issues that is likely not resolvable and that, at all events, 
has generally not been engaged by commentators in the debate over 
the income tax treatment of gifts. A further point is that coherence in 
normative orientation can make for what might seem to be strange 
bedfellows. For example, the idea that the income tax should be 
progressive may entail that psychic benefits or welfare also be part of 
the “income” tax base (at least setting aside administrative and other 
practical considerations), a position that many commentators who 
defend progressivity reject.9
7. See, e.g., Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 452.
8. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 4, at 348.
9. As an example, Henry Simons, widely acknowledged as the progenitor 
of the modern concept of income, defined it in terms of economic power, not utility. 
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A final ambition is to suggest that the type of problem 
discussed here is not unique to the question of how the income tax 
should apply to gifts. Like any tax base, the income base reflects an 
effort to operationalize a prior set of normative commitments; it does 
not, by itself, function as a final normative authority. Scholars should 
be aware of the limited serviceability of tax base concepts as 
guideposts to tax rules when they seek answers to foundational 
normative questions. The base serves as a heuristic, not as an 
Archimedean point.10 Therefore it often will not be possible to settle 
normative tax questions through analysis of the principles that 
determine what is in or out of the base.
SCHOLARLY APPROACHES TO THE INCOME TAXATION OF GIFTS
Three broad philosophical orientations dominate the current 
literature on theories of social and political cooperation: welfarist-
type theories, under which some social good is sought to be 
maximized without regard to any particular individual’s superior 
entitlement to anyone else’s;11 libertarian or quasi-libertarian 
theories, under which government is viewed solely as providing 
otherwise unavailable benefits to individuals who owe few or no 
duties to each other beyond those established through voluntary 
agreement;12 and, for lack of a better term, fairness-based theories, 
under which some principle of resource distribution in accordance 
with merit or desert both alters the allocation of resources that results 
from private voluntary activity and is subject to significant 
See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. See also Alvin Warren, Would a 
Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1096-97
(1980) (“The respect accorded noneconomic differences by our political system . . . 
arguably [] derives from fundamental views about the primacy of persons over 
things, views that assume it is possible to treat people as distinct from their product, 
whether consumed or not, a distinction that would not obtain under the broader 
utilitarian view of distributive justice.”).
10. In a well-known article, Boris Bittker developed the related idea that the 
concept of income is incapable of providing a rule for what counts as an acceptable 
versus an unacceptable departure from a comprehensive income tax base. See 
generally Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax 
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967). The argument here extends Bittker’s by 
noting that a problem with comprehensive bases (be they income, consumption, or 
something else) is that they reflect intermediate judgments about how to allocate and 
distribute tax burdens, not final ones.
11. The main historical antecedent is the utilitarianism of Bentham.
12. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 297 (1974).
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limitations.13 Each approach might provide a different justification 
for income as a tax base and, by extension, a different rule for the 
proper income taxation of gifts because each position implies a 
different view about the purpose of an income tax and, consequently, 
about the meaning of “income” itself.
Of primary significance, most,14 but not all,15 commentators in 
the tax literature do not explicitly associate themselves with any of 
these approaches. Instead, they proceed to define “income” in some 
way and then to argue for a regime for gifts on the basis of the 
definition. In order to highlight the conceptual problems with this 
way of proceeding, the discussion below is organized much as the 
literature has organized itself. It asks first whether the gift is income 
to both the donor and the donee or to just one of them. It then asks, 
in the case where the answer to the first question is that the gift is 
income to just one party, which party. The main conclusion of these 
inquiries is that the definition of income itself is somewhat arbitrary, 
for the reasons described above. A secondary conclusion is that some 
common intuitions about what an income tax should and should not 
require or permit are in some measure inconsistent with each other 
even though they often are found together.
A. Double Taxation
Proponents of double taxation can be found in each of the three 
camps just described. The argument of this Section is that welfare-
based and fairness-based views may support double taxation under 
certain assumptions, while a libertarian-type view, sometimes 
referred to as a “real asset” or “classical income” base, does not.
1. Welfarist Views
The idea that tax burdens should be allocated so as to maximize 
overall utility or some other aggregately determined quantity has a 
13. John Rawls was the most prominent contemporary proponent of such a 
view. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
14. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 5, at 1185 (explaining “income” means the 
relative capacity of the taxpaying unit to contribute to the public sector); 
Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 32-37 (explaining “income” means the ability to pay as 
measured by economic power to consume or dispose of wealth).
15. See generally Louis Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts, 88 AM. ECON. REV.
283 (1998) (adopting an explicitly welfarist approach to the tax policy for gifts).
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long pedigree.16 Against an assumed backdrop of free market 
exchange, the principle for taxation generally would be to assign 
burdens so that the loss in welfare, or utility, from taxpaying is 
minimized.17 If the customary assumption of the declining marginal 
utility of resources also is made, then a principle of disutility 
minimization generally would result in some scheme of progressive 
taxation, more or less regardless of the actual base, assuming the 
base is measured in real resources and not in utility itself. 
Progressivity follows because the declining marginal utility of actual 
resources means that the amount of utility the taxpayer derives from 
enjoying more of the explicit base—be it consumption in the case of 
a consumption base, income in the case of an income base, and so 
forth—declines with each additional unit of the resource made 
available to the taxpayer. Because individuals get more utility out of 
the first dollar earned (income) or spent (consumption) than out of 
the millionth, it makes sense to take a larger portion of the millionth 
than of the first, setting aside incentive effects of the tax. In point of 
fact, under a social welfare function that values all utility equally and 
assumes utility corresponds to wealth, the only limitation on 
equalizing all incomes would be the incentive effects of taxation at 
100% for all income in excess of the mean income.18
Under a welfarist view of this kind, the actual tax base—say, 
accessions to wealth or amounts expended on consumption—
represents merely an approximation of what we want to tax. That is, 
because it is not possible to observe or tax welfare directly, a proxy 
is needed. Consequently, when a straightforward application of the 
base to a particular situation characteristically results in a substantial 
departure from what the system attempts to approximate with the 
base, a case is made for departing from the base, resulting in what 
may appear to be either double taxation or failure to tax. The typical 
gift represents such a situation. The giving of a gift, because it is by 
nature a voluntary act, must be understood to generate some benefit 
to the donor at least equal to the welfare (or to the utility, psychic 
16. For an overview of utilitarian theories of taxation and problems with 
implementing a tax based on utility, see Carolyn C. Jones, Treatment of Gratuitous 
Transfers: Unraveling the Case for a Consumption Tax, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1155, 
1162-67 (1985).
17. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 455-61 (1952), for a discussion of the 
related “equal sacrifice” principle under which tax burdens are assessed based on 
utility.
18. See id. at 467-68.
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benefit, etc.) to the donor of what is surrendered; otherwise the gift 
would not be made. In the meantime, the donee must be understood 
to enjoy a benefit at least equal to the benefit he or she would enjoy 
had the value of the amount received been earned. Indeed, it is likely 
greater inasmuch as the (typical) disutility of work is avoided. Thus, 
apparent double taxation follows if the donee is taxed on after-tax 
dollars received from the donor, assuming the donor receives no 
offsetting deduction. Yet because the relevant criterion is posited to 
be welfare or some other psychic characteristic and not money, no 
double tax actually would arise, assuming the true objective is to tax 
welfare and not its proxy. Barring administrative concerns, and
setting aside incentive effects, the proper rule would require donees 
to report gifts as taxable income while continuing to deny a 
deduction to donors.19
The preceding analysis is incomplete because it does not take 
into account incentive effects of the tax rule, as most utility views 
would.20 If the donee is taxed, the donee’s tax liability may make 
enough of a difference to the donor’s utility to cause the donor not to 
make the gift. For example, suppose that, prior to accounting for the 
donee’s tax liability, the donor derives $125 of utility from a $100 
gift to the donee and that all of the donor’s alternative uses of the 
$100 consist of consumption purchases from which she would derive 
no more than $100 in psychic benefit. If the donee’s marginal 
bracket exceeds 20%, and assuming the donor’s utility from the gift 
varies directly with the amount of the donee’s after-tax income, the 
donor will not make the gift because an after-tax gift to the donee of 
less than $80 will produce less than $100 of utility to the donor. The 
tax results in a total loss in social welfare of at least $100 (measured 
in the donor’s terms) from failure of the gift. Thus, under this 
approach, relatively lighter taxation of donors, and possibly even a 
net subsidy, would be appropriate because the total utility from the 
gift is roughly twice the total utility from the donor’s own 
consumption.21
19. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Book V, 
Ch. 2, § 5 (1885), for an early statement of this view as applied to inheritances.
20. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 283. Kaplow provides an example of an 
approach that focuses on the incentive effects on utility of taxing gifts. Id.
21. See id. at 284-85.
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2. Classical Income View
The main alternative to the view that income functions as a 
proxy for welfare is the classical view of income developed over the 
course of the first half of the twentieth century by Robert Haig, 
Georg Schanz, and later, Henry Simons.22 Under the now-familiar 
“Haig-Simons” definition, personal income is “the algebraic sum of 
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the 
change in the value of the store of property rights between the 
beginning and end of the period in question.”23 In essence, personal 
income is the increase in the market value of the taxpayer’s 
economic rights during the accounting period, recognizing that rights 
cashed out in consumption are income nonetheless. In theory, this 
definition reflects the concept of “ability to pay,” where ability is 
understood in terms of real goods or services in principle available to 
pay for government, regardless of whether the taxpayer has 
voluntarily transformed some of those rights into consumption 
benefits.24 This classical view, sometimes referred to herein as the 
real asset view, though neither strictly implying nor strictly implied 
by libertarian social theory, does have significant affinities with such 
a theory. If, for example, one considers the primary purpose of 
taxation to be to pay for public goods and that the extent of 
enjoyment of public goods roughly corresponds to the material 
resources one is able to obtain through markets that are established 
and protected through the provision of public goods, then the real 
asset view of taxation would seem to follow.25
Depending upon one’s approach to the status of consumption 
items as a proxy for income, the classical definition may seem to 
support taxation of either: (a) one of, but not both, the donee and the 
donor, or (b) both the donee and the donor (by means of taxing the 
donee and denying the donor a deduction).26 Here I argue that the 
22. See Bittker, supra note 10, at 932; Carl S. Shoup, The Schanz Concept 
of Income and the United States Federal Income Tax, 42 FINANZARCHIV 433, 434 
(1984).
23. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION 
OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
24. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 452-54, for a development of this 
point.
25. F.A. Hayek is an exemplar of this view. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 307 (1960).
26. As far as I am aware, no one in the classical income camp regards as 
reasonable the fourth possibility—deduction to donor and exclusion for donee—
since it would eliminate the resources that gifts consist of from the tax base.
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classical income view logically supports single taxation only. Those 
who argue for double taxation under the classical view in fact revert 
to either a welfarist approach or a fairness-based one (discussed 
below). In Section B, I argue further that, apart from reasons 
unrelated to the concept of income, under the classical or real asset 
view the single tax properly should fall on the donee if one has 
decided that income is a measure of ability in resources possessed 
(an accessions tax), but on the donor if it is a measure of resources 
produced (an accumulations tax).
The claim has often been advanced that the classical view 
supports double taxation of gifts.27 Double taxation rests on the 
intuitive idea, already explored, that the donee has experienced an 
increase in wealth by reason of the gift,28 while the donor is in a 
position no different from the purchaser of a consumption item who 
enjoys no deduction by reason of the consumption.29 As regards the 
donee, the fact that the increase in wealth comes by way of gift 
rather than the donee’s own labor seems, if anything, to strengthen 
the case for donee taxation. Under an accessions income tax, the 
focus is on the extent to which the taxpayer has been enriched during 
the accounting period, not on whether the enrichment involved the 
creation of wealth;30 the fact that the wealth received was not the 
product of as yet-untaxed economic activity is not relevant.31 Further, 
earning income typically requires bearing psychic costs—the 
disutility of work—while receipt of a gift does not.32 Although we do 
27. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 23, at 125; Dodge, supra note 5, at 1185-
86; Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 28.
28. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1177; see also Klein, supra note 1, at 226.
29. See SIMONS, supra note 23, at 128. More recently it has been advocated 
in various forms by Joseph Dodge and Marjorie Kornhauser. See Dodge, supra note 
5, at 1185-86; Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 28. I review their arguments below.
30. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1185.
31. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). In Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), an early income tax case, the Court had defined 
“income” as “‘the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.’” 
Id. at 415 (quoting Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 
(1913), which was a case dealing with the pre-Sixteenth Amendment corporate tax). 
In Glenshaw Glass, the Court stated that the earlier definition had not been intended 
to limit the concept of income to amounts the taxpayer so produced but rather that, 
under the income tax, income included amounts “clearly realized” whether or not 
the product of the individual’s productive labor or capital. 348 U.S. at 431. On this 
basis, the Court held that punitive and exemplary damages the taxpayer received 
were includible in income. Id.
32. See Klein, supra note 1, at 227, for a discussion of this point and related 
legislative history.
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not generally provide a deduction for psychic costs, it nonetheless 
seems that if we are willing to tax the earner on the full value of 
wages even in light of the psychic costs she must bear, then the 
donee is at least as worthy of bearing the full tax associated with the 
same wealth increase when the donee incurred no psychic detriment 
to obtain the wealth.
As regards the donor, the psychological parallelism between 
the use of income for purchase and its use as a gift suggests that no 
deduction should be available. In both cases, the person parting with 
the wealth does so voluntarily, and consequently it seems that what 
is received “in exchange”—namely, the psychic benefit—must be of 
at least equal value to what is surrendered, for otherwise the 
transaction would not take place. As in a purchase transaction, the 
donor has merely swapped physical wealth for psychic wealth or, 
what seems the same, has generated the corresponding benefit 
through spending. Indeed, a number of commentators view the 
equivalence between the consumer’s benefit from consumption and 
the donor’s from giving as bordering on self-evident. Professor 
Joseph Dodge, for example, states in an influential 1978 article: 
“[T]he donor’s voluntary transfer of the gift itself indicates the 
donor’s ability to pay.”33
The difficulty with this argument is that appeal to the analogy 
between the psychic income from consumption and that from giving 
appears to be question-begging, while the reasoning that 
independently would support identical treatment of the two 
transactions under a real asset view is suspect. As regards the 
analogy, it simply does not follow from the fact that preclusive 
consumption and voluntary giving both generate psychic benefits 
that the donor has “income” in both cases. Rather the very question 
is whether one should consider psychic benefits to be income. 
As regards the reasoning, consider that after the gift, the donor 
plainly has fewer resources than before. Therefore the gift can be 
said not to affect the donor’s ability to pay only if one has decided 
that something other than the psychic benefit resulting from the gift 
contributes to the donor’s income—that is, to her ability to pay—by 
at least as much as the amount given has reduced it. It is, however, 
unclear what that something would be.
The most natural objection to this argument is that it appears to 
prove too much. If for tax purposes we are unwilling to treat as the 
33. Dodge, supra note 5, at 1186. See also Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 37-
38.
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equivalent of wealth the psychic benefit the taxpayer receives by 
voluntarily parting with the gift, why are we willing to assert the 
equivalence in the case of the conversion of wealth into a 
consumption experience in (or following) a market transaction? 
After all, no one disputes that the concept of ability to pay properly 
includes the market value of rights consumed during the period. If it 
does, do we not, after all, have a basis for concluding that the 
psychic benefit from personal consumption is what justifies denial of 
a deduction for that consumption? What, in short, is the difference 
between the purchase of a psychic benefit realized in consumption 
and its derivation from a mere transfer to another by gift that 
warrants retention of the first but not the second in the tax base? In 
both cases, the taxpayer is left without the wealth but with a psychic 
benefit obtained by its disposition.
However intuitive the objection may appear, it fails because it 
presupposes that the reason for including purchased consumption 
items in the base is the equivalence of the psychic value to the 
taxpayer of the thing purchased with the wealth used to purchase it. 
In fact, circumstances besides psychic benefits support the inclusion 
of the value of consumed items in a real income base, among them 
that the consumption reflects the direction of real assets to the 
consumer for his preclusive use.34 When Moviegoer purchases a 
movie ticket, the movie-watching experience goes to Moviegoer and 
not to someone else. Preclusive use is not so much destruction as it is 
transformation into a subjective flow of services that are now
internal to the consumer; it is of no consequence that the consumer 
received psychic value from the flow that (typically) is at least 
roughly equal to its fair market value. Indeed, the tax is the same on 
the consumer regardless of how much she values the psychic flow. In 
short, it is not the psychic benefit that justifies denial of a deduction 
on consumption but the fact that the consumer no less “has” the thing 
consumed by virtue of the consumption than she did before, when 
she owned it. Thus, contrary to the suggestion above, and unlike in 
the gift case, the consumer of a good or service is not without the 
item when she consumes it; she merely has it in a different form.
One might reply that the above argument is inconsistent with 
the treatment of business outlays, which generally are recoverable 
34. Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 461, address this argument as well, 
though their opposition to double taxation rests on a view different from the one 
developed below.
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for tax purposes, 35 apparently precisely because, unlike personal 
outlays, they do not provide a psychic benefit. But this reply too is 
mistaken. To be sure, as a general matter, some sort of cost recovery 
(typically either immediate deduction, or capitalization36 coupled 
with depreciation or amortization37) is available for business outlays 
but not for personal ones.38 Moreover, it is generally true that 
business outlays, unlike personal ones, do not supply a psychic
benefit.39 However, the reason cost recovery for business outlays is 
available has nothing to do with the absence of psychic benefits; 
rather, it has to do with the timing of the benefits that are expected to 
be realized from the outlay. For one thing, a business outlay does not 
represent a loss to the taxpayer.40 It is, after all, voluntary. Therefore 
the expected benefits from the outlay must at least equal those that 
would be gained on an alternative personal outlay; otherwise the 
taxpayer would not make it. Under the theory advanced by those 
who view psychic benefits as income, it would seem no deduction at 
all under a psychic benefits theory should be available for business 
outlays.
More to the point, the difference between the two types of 
expenditure is merely one of timing. A business outlay is an 
investment in anticipated future income.41 As contrasted with a 
personal outlay, the use of a good or service for business purposes 
constitutes its transformation into something else that will be 
separately accounted for as an income item later on.42 In short, cost 
35. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162(a) (2012) (deduction for “ordinary and 
necessary” business expenses); 167(a) (depreciation deduction for capital assets 
used in a trade or business or for the production of income); 212(1) (deduction for 
expenses incurred in the production of income). In the discussion in the text, the 
terms “business expenses” and “business outlays” include outlays for the production 
of income.
36. See § 263(a).
37. See, e.g., §§ 167 (depreciation of tangible property); 193 (amortization 
of certain intangible assets).
38. See § 262(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, 
no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.”).
39. See Charlotte Crane, Liabilities and the Need to Keep the Income Tax 
Base Closed, 25 VA. TAX REV. 31, 44-45 (2005).
40. David Hasen, The Tax Treatment of Advance Receipts, 61 TAX L. REV.
395, 434 n.178 (2008) (discussing the principles of business cost recovery).
41. See Crane, supra note 39, at 44-45 (observing that amounts spent in 
business do not generate a loss but, instead, that “value [spent to produce income] is 
replaced by income earned in the normal course of the taxpayer’s business”); see 
also David Hasen, supra note 40, at 434 n.178.
42. See Crane, supra note 39, at 44-45; Hasen, supra note 40, at 434 n.178.
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recovery for business outlays reflects an accounting convention, not 
a view about the absence of psychic benefits.
To see this point, consider the case of equipment used to 
produce inventory. From a business perspective, the equipment is 
effectively transformed into the inventory over time. When the 
inventory is sold, the consumed equipment is recovered in the sale. 
Where cost recovery for the equipment is allowed, the cost of goods 
sold does not include the apportionable cost of the equipment, 
precisely because it has already been recovered.43 However, one 
could equally deny the cost recovery deduction for the equipment 
and instead add its cost to the cost of the inventory (thereby reducing 
income realized on its sale) to get an accurate measure of the 
taxpayer’s income. Indeed, this regime does apply to certain 
taxpayers in certain cases.44 Under it, there is no deduction for 
business outlays because, as always, there is no loss, and because the 
taxpayer still “has” the item expended; it is embodied in the good or 
service that the taxpayer sells. Here, there would be no deduction 
even though there is no psychic benefit.
The point for present purposes is that personal consumption 
does not differ from business consumption in that both consist of the 
use of one thing to affect the properties of another—the equipment to 
make the widget; the hamburger to sustain the eater. The two are the 
same just in the sense that the properties of what is consumed have a 
particular effect on or embodiment in something else and do not 
reflect a loss of the taxpayer. The difference in the personal setting is 
that the properties are embodied immediately in something the 
taxpayer seeks for her own benefit as an end rather than for the 
purpose of realizing income in the future, but this truth does not 
affect the basic point that the reason the taxpayer is not worse off 
(under a real asset view) by reason of the consumption—whether 
business or personal—is not that she has a psychic benefit but that 
she has simply changed the asset from one form to another of 
equivalent real (not psychic) worth. Further, whether the end 
generates a psychic benefit of equivalent value to the cost of the 
thing consumed or not is beside the point; it does not alter the fact 
that the thing is transformed into, as it were, a property of the 
consumer—that is, it affects her person just through its 
43. See, e.g., Gardiner v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 1202, 1207-08 (D. 
Utah 1975), aff’d, 536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976).
44. See § 263A (discussing the capitalization and inclusion of costs of 
inventory of certain expenses).
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transformation, but the tax reaches the thing or what it is turned into, 
just as in the case of a business outlay. Or, stated in the converse, the 
tax does not fail to apply merely because the physical wealth has 
changed its form but not its value.
Contrast this internalization or transformation that takes place 
in consumption with the benefit that Donor receives on making a 
gift. In a gift, no resources are directed to the donor or internalized 
by her, and the consumed item has no effect on her. The proper 
analogy in the exchange case to the Donor’s enjoyment of the gift 
therefore would not be to the consumer but to the provider of the 
consumed good or service. The analogy is not to Moviegoer’s 
enjoyment of a purchased movie-watching experience, but to 
Cinema’s psychic benefit (if any) derived from selling the movie-
watching experience to Moviegoer. More generally, it is to the 
enjoyment, if any, that one derives from work. Like Donor’s 
enjoyment of Donee’s enrichment, Cinema’s would be derived apart 
from the direction to or destruction of resources for the benefit of 
Cinema. A person who likes his or her job is not said to have income 
from liking it unless income is understood to include psychic 
benefits. But this, of course, is just the point: Under a real asset view, 
income does not include psychic benefits. Moreover, if it did, it 
seems a deduction ought to be available for the psychic detriment 
associated with the more typical pain of earning income. It is 
generally taken as axiomatic, however, that the pain or “disutility” of 
earning income should not offset the income itself under a true Haig-
Simons base.45
One might counter that the psychic benefit to Donor can be 
distinguished from the utility or, more often, disutility, from work in 
that Donor’s psychic benefit is a sine qua non of the gift, while 
Cinema’s is not of the sale. Cinema’s ticket sale to Moviegoer will 
occur whether or not Cinema enjoys providing the movie-going 
experience. But the significance of motivation for the psychic benefit 
to the tax treatment is murky. All that the observation establishes is 
that, if we were to tax on the basis of psychic benefits received, we 
could be confident that the donor’s benefit at least equaled the value 
of the gift given. This argument presupposes that the reason psychic 
benefits and detriments are left out of the base is not that psychic 
effects do not count as income (or loss) but that it is too difficult to 
45. See John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type 
Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of 
Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2164 n.234 (2000).
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quantify them, a difficulty absent in the gift case. If, however, that 
were the case, one would think some method of approximating them 
would be in order given the very real psychic benefits and detriments
that many activities predictably entail. For example, for most people, 
work imposes substantial psychic costs. Why not incorporate some 
estimate of these costs into the tax base if we aim to measure income 
accurately and believe it to consist of psychic benefits? Further, why 
not tax income that is not accompanied with psychic costs, such as 
windfalls, more heavily than wage income?
One can summarize the argument of this section as follows: 
The fact that material resources are produced or obtained for the 
purpose of generating psychic satisfactions—in other words, the fact 
that consumption of physical resources is in a sense an intermediate 
rather than an ultimate value—does not imply that psychic 
satisfactions are the object of the tax. In fact, the point of 
distinguishing psychic satisfactions from income, if one is so 
inclined, is to insist that income is not reducible to psychic benefits. 
Income may be produced in order to realize psychic benefits, but it 
need not be considered the same thing. Again, the point is not that 
there is something in principle wrong with understanding income as 
a proxy for psychic benefits or “welfare” however construed, but 
rather that if one wishes to distinguish income from welfare, then 
one ought not justify the tax on consumption on the basis of the 
equivalence of the monetary value of psychic benefits derived from 
consumption and the thing (or service) consumed. Rather, the tax on 
consumption (as part of the definition of income as consumption plus 
change in wealth) follows from the fact that the income realized to 
finance the consumption is still “with” the taxpayer after 
consumption, not because of the psychic benefits but because the 
physical transformation of the real thing into a property of the 
taxpayer does not imply that the taxpayer no longer has the benefit of 
the thing transformed.
3. Fairness Views
A third strand of views considers taxation as a way to 
implement a principle of fairness.46 Here the objective is not to 
46. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 246-47 (explaining that John Rawls is the 
preeminent modern advocate of the idea of justice as fairness). Although Rawls 
voiced support for consumption taxation in A Theory of Justice, he also qualified the 
support as applicable to something akin to a first-best world and suggested that 
income taxation might be appropriate under actual historical circumstances. See id.;
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allocate tax burdens in order to maximize some aggregate quantity, 
such as total welfare or utility, nor is it simply to finance government 
through available resources wherever they may be found.47 Rather 
the objective is to allocate burdens in accordance with some 
principle of fair distribution, such as equality of opportunity or 
result, or respect for persons, and to do so based on relevant 
attributes of those who bear the burdens.48 As an example, Ronald 
Dworkin argues for a principle of fair equality of resources, where 
equality is measured with respect to otherwise arbitrarily distributed 
endowments.49 The idea is to eliminate the disparities in resources 
that result from these distributions but not those that result from 
individual choices. Under Dworkin’s view, an income tax might 
implement such a distributive principle, and progressivity might be a 
feature of the tax.50 As another example, John Rawls, though he 
voiced an abstract preference for an expenditure tax (i.e., a cash-flow 
consumption tax), acknowledged that in certain circumstances 
income taxation and indeed progressive income taxation could be an 
appropriate way to implement what he calls the difference principle, 
which requires that social institutions be structured to the advantage 
of the least-advantaged social group.51
In some respects, fairness views occupy a kind of middle 
ground between the welfarist and real asset views. On one hand, the 
rejection of market outcomes as necessarily determinative of the 
allocation of resources implies that societal goods are subject to 
more-centralized control than they are under libertarian theories: 
Government transfers may adjust market outcomes, as under 
welfarist theories. On the other hand, fairness views generally seek 
to redistribute resources based on some notion of individual merit or 
desert rather than with regard solely to what maximizes some desired 
end, such as utility. Under a fairness theory, not all social wealth is 
in principle available for government transfer simply because a 
different distribution or allocation would better maximize the total 
see also JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 160-61 (1985) (noting 
that proportional taxation might be applied if institutions otherwise satisfy the 
principles of justice).
47. See RAWLS, supra note 46, at 160-61.
48. See id. (explaining the way taxation can be used to implement a 
standard of fairness).
49. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 307 (1981); see also ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 99
(1991) (adopting an approach similar to Dworkin’s).
50. See Dworkin, supra note 49, at 325-26.
51. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 266.
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pie.52 In this respect, fairness theories resemble libertarian theories, 
with the difference that fairness-based views do not assume that 
market outcomes typically accord with merit or desert.
Corresponding to this intermediate position, whether any given 
fairness view authorizes double taxation of gifts depends on what it 
considers and does not consider to be available under a tax-and-
transfer scheme to ensure a fair distribution of resources. For 
instance, consider the principle of guaranteeing substantive equality 
of opportunity. Under a strong version of this principle, each 
individual is entitled to some standard initial bundle of goods or 
opportunities, perhaps compensated to account for relatively fewer or 
greater benefits afforded by birth or social position, but not to 
more.53 Under a weaker version of the principle, the government 
might ensure a baseline but not require equality of initial resources.54
Now suppose in either case that the financing scheme for the 
guarantee is some amount of redistribution through taxation. The 
question is whether or not an individual’s resources deemed 
available to fund the bundle include both amounts given (in the case 
of donors) and amounts received (in the case of donees). If the idea 
is that one should pay according to his or her welfare as 
provisionally evidenced by material resources rather than according 
to the resources themselves, it seems double taxation of gifts is 
appropriate since the donor’s welfare includes the welfare produced 
through the gift and the donee has resources from the gift; the notion 
would be that the gift does not reduce donor welfare for the reasons 
already explored. If the idea is that one should pay according to 
material resources one holds, then it seems only a single level of tax 
should apply, and, for reasons developed below, it seems the tax 
ought not be progressive, and the liability should fall on the donee, 
not the donor. In short, as under the views already discussed, what 
counts as income for purposes of taxing gifts depends on which 
principle the income tax is thought to implement.
52. See, e.g., id. at 28 (“[T]he rights secured by justice are not subject to 
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.”); see also Dworkin, supra 
note 49, at 335-36 (arguing that society has no duty to maximize the utility of people 
who happen to have expensive tastes).
53. See generally Richard J. Arneson, Against Rawlsian Equality of 
Opportunity, 93 PHIL. STUD. 77 (1999) for a discussion of the principle of 
substantive equality of opportunity.
54. Rawls’s difference principle is one example. Under the principle, social 
institutions must be arranged to the advantage of the least-advantaged group, but 
there is no requirement that more-advantaged groups be placed on the same footing 
as less-advantaged ones. See RAWLS, supra note 46, at 42-43.
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Examples could be multiplied, but the logic is straightforward. 
A fairness view looks to some principle of merit or desert to inform 
the distribution of societal resources and burdens. If the view 
effectuates its desired distribution in whole or part through an 
income tax, the income tax treatment of gifts will depend on what is 
considered to be a resource subject to governmental control for this 
purpose.
4. Notable Double-Tax Views
The preceding three Subsections discussed in general terms the 
relationships between prominent theories of social and political 
organization and the associated concepts of income that would, in 
turn, inform the question of how to treat gifts under the income tax. 
The idea was to show how these theories do or do not support double 
taxation of gifts. This Subsection reviews two influential arguments 
for the double taxation of gifts. Here the object is to show how 
attempts to derive a rule for the taxation of gifts based on a definition 
of income—how, that is, efforts that proceed in the reverse 
direction—tend to founder.
a. Dodge’s “Income in the Tax Sense”
In a 1978 article,55 Dodge argued for double taxation of gifts on 
the basis that the donee clearly enjoys what he called “income in the 
tax sense,” while the voluntary nature of the transfer makes the 
donor’s position no different from that of a purchaser of a 
consumption item.56
For Dodge, income in the tax sense “describe[s] the 
measurement of the taxable unit’s capacity to contribute to the public 
sector relative to other taxable units.”57 It is to be distinguished from 
income in the “economic sense,” which refers to the creation of
wealth and may be taken as an expression as well of early legal 
formulations of the income concept.58 Perhaps the most well-known 
55. See generally Dodge, supra note 5.
56. Dodge, supra note 5 at 1185-86 (“[T]he donor’s voluntary transfer of 
the gift itself indicates the donor’s ability to pay.”). In a later article, Dodge argued 
that the same principle applies to a consumption tax. See generally Joseph M. 
Dodge, Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Consumption Tax, 51 TAX L. REV. 529
(1996).
57. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1185.
58. Id.
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such legal formulation appears in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., Co., in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court said that income results from the 
activity of capital, labor, or the two combined.59 As Dodge rightly 
notes, such a definition will not do for a concept of “personal” rather 
than aggregate (national) income if the object of the definition is to 
set forth a criterion according to which one can measure a given 
taxpaying unit’s relative capacity to bear the costs of public sector 
finance (and presumably redistribution if desired).60 Whether the 
taxpaying unit comes by the item through a zero-sum transfer (e.g., a 
gift) or by creating it, the material capacity of the taxpayer to bear 
the costs of government is increased to the same extent.61 Dodge is 
correct that under an “income in the tax sense” standard, the donee’s 
ability to pay has increased and, absent some overriding policy 
consideration,62 ought to be viewed as taxable on the gift.63
As for the donor, the question whether a deduction ought to be 
available depends solely on that person’s ability to bear those same 
costs. According to Dodge, no deduction is appropriate for the now-
familiar reason that in the transfer the donor merely exchanges the 
physical asset for a psychic benefit of equal value, in effect 
“consuming” the gift.64 As explained previously, however, under a 
real asset definition of income, the reason consumption items are not
deducted from the income tax base is that they represent the 
conversion of physical assets (or services) into a property of the 
taxpayer, not that they generate a psychic benefit of equivalent 
economic value.65
It follows that Dodge’s argument for double taxation of gifts is 
correct only if income in the tax sense includes psychic income. 
Although Dodge does not explicitly address the question, his 
conceptualization of income as ability to pay suggests he does not so 
understand it. He argues, for example, that a deduction for the donor 
is inappropriate because “the making of a gift represents the 
59. 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918).
60. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1185.
61. See id. at 1186.
62. Among possible such considerations are the administrative difficulty of 
identifying gifts, the incentive effects on gift-giving of taxing the donee, and the fact 
that making the donee aware of the value of a gift may vitiate or even nullify the 
purpose of the gift.
63. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1186.
64. See id. at 1186-87.
65. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 454-55 (sharing a similar view about 
the purpose of the tax under the real asset view).
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voluntary exercise of the donor’s economic power.”66 The use of the 
term “economic power” suggests that Dodge means to focus on real 
assets or what he takes to be their substitutes—namely, the 
enjoyment derived from consuming or gifting them—as a definition 
of the base, but for the reasons already provided, grouping these 
together supposes that psychic benefits are part of the base too. 
Perhaps more importantly, if Dodge means that psychic benefits are 
to be included in the base, it becomes unclear why the base is limited 
to economic accumulations and the psychic benefits that come from 
disposing of them, whether by consumption or by gift. It rather 
seems that other psychic benefits and detriments ought to be 
included as well, such as the utility or disutility from one’s work, or 
the enjoyment (or not) of one’s family, or of prestige. Dodge does 
not suggest, however, an expansion of the income concept to include 
such benefits and detriments.
b. Kornhauser’s “Power to Control Scarce Resources”
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser likewise claims that the Haig-
Simons definition of income properly understood supports double 
taxation of gifts, though on a slightly different basis from Dodge. 
Kornhauser argues that the income concept includes not just, or even 
so much, the right to consume resources but the power to determine 
who consumes them—the “power to affect consumption.”67
Specifically, Kornhauser observes that Simons’s definition embraces 
both consumption and accessions to wealth, and she argues that 
accessions differ from consumption not just in that they represent 
potential rather than actual preclusive use by the taxpayer but also in 
that they carry with them the power to determine the identity of the 
preclusive user.68 In this sense, the term “income” as Simons 
employs it primarily identifies powers, not their exercise. Income 
consists of accessions to the powers to direct resources and to use 
them (consumption or preclusive use).69 It is these powers, in turn, 
that determine the taxpayer’s “ability to pay,” the touchstone for 
Kornhauser of the income concept.70 A tax on income therefore is a 
tax on the increase in powers.
66. See Dodge, supra note 5, at 1186.
67. Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 32.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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Kornhauser is probably correct that this was Simons’s view. As 
previously noted, Simons believed the double tax regime was 
appropriate for gifts, and Simons also viewed income as primarily 
power over economic resources, not as their use.71 The donor plainly 
exercises power over the gifted property, suggesting that Simons 
considered the exercise of the power through the gifting of it to be 
the same as the exercise of the power through its consumption—
neither represents a deductible outlay. Meanwhile, after the gift has 
been made, the donee enjoys the same powers to consume and to 
give as the donor enjoyed, suggesting that inclusion is appropriate 
for her as well.
Kornhauser’s focus on powers also may appear to support 
treating the double-tax view as consistent with the real asset theory 
of income taxation, since the concept of ability to pay she adopts 
does not explicitly rest on psychic benefits or utility. In fact, 
however, Kornhauser’s position amounts to either a restatement of a 
welfarist view or simply a stipulative definition of income; it does 
not authorize double taxation under the real asset view. To begin 
with, note that it is not obvious why, if income consists in part in the 
accession to the power to determine who consumes, the transfer of 
that power is not negative income. If the claim is that income does 
not result from utility but because the receipt of the power increases 
the taxpayer’s ability understood in some other sense, then what is 
that other sense, such that the ability is not diminished on the transfer 
to another of the power to consume, since the power is now lost? The 
idea seems to be the by-now familiar one that exercise of the power 
to determine who consumes is analogous to the exercise of the 
consumption power, for which no deduction is available.
As developed above, however, ordinary consumption does not 
result in the loss of the thing consumed so much as its 
transformation, and this is why, on the real asset view, no deduction 
for consumption is allowed. Indeed, it is not so much that later 
consumption does not vitiate income but that the very point of 
treating accession to the power to consume as income is that the 
wealth will be consumed. By contrast, the power to determine the 
identity of the consumer has value only because, or at any rate 
primarily because, of the prospect of consumption itself.72 If gifts 
71. See SIMONS, supra note 23, at 49; Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 32 
n.117.
72. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive 
Consumption Tax, 102 TAX NOTES 91, 103-06 (2004), for a discussion of this point. 
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were outlawed, goods and services would still have value, but if the 
consumption of goods and services were outlawed, the making of 
gifts would not. The observation indicates that the value of the power 
to determine the identity of the consumer derives from the more 
basic value of consumption itself. That value is just the benefit that 
redounds to the consumer by the act of consumption.
Thus it is not surprising that in some cases, events following 
the accession to the power to consume are thought to justify a 
deduction of previously received income, even under the real asset 
view. Most theorists probably would agree that the conceptually 
correct treatment of an uninsurable casualty loss under the real asset
view is a deduction.73 Presumably the reason is that the taxpayer has 
lost the value of the wealth. She has never been able to make good, 
through consumption, the value of its receipt. If this is correct, the 
question becomes whether different treatment is appropriate when, in 
the case of a gift, the taxpayer also parts with that very same power. 
Of course the gift is voluntary, but that explains merely how the 
value comes to be transmitted (there is utility derived of at least 
equivalent value to the gift). But since the real asset view takes no 
account of utility in determining what counts as income, it becomes 
unclear why different treatment of the donor and the victim of the 
casualty loss would be appropriate. What, besides utility, does the 
donor obtain in the gift that offsets what is removed from her control 
by the gift? At least in a pure gift, where the object is not to 
influence the donee (or for that matter someone else) in the donor’s 
favor, the donor receives nothing from the donee apart from the 
psychic benefit. The donor does not enjoy the benefit of the wealth, 
just as in the case of a casualty loss. The difference is that, unlike in 
the case of a casualty loss, someone else does enjoy the benefit. But 
As developed later in this Subsection, there may be value in simply holding wealth, 
which value may in fact be captured under an inclusion–deduction regime for gifts.
73. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of 
Personal Property Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REV. 454 (1971) 
(arguing generally that a deduction for a casualty is generally correct because it 
reduces the value of the taxpayer’s store of rights). Until 2018, a deduction was 
available for personal casualty losses sustained by the taxpayer, subject to a number 
of limitations enacted mostly for administrative reasons. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 165(c)(3) 
(2012) (permitting the deduction), 165(h) (limiting the deduction to $100 per 
casualty per taxpayer and generally only to the extent that all such losses (to the 
extent in excess of $100 per casualty per taxpayer) exceeded of 10% of the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income for the year). Congress suspended the deduction, 
with a few exceptions, for the years 2018-25. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 115-97, § 11044(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2087 (2017).
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that person would be taxed under a real asset view that focuses on 
ability to pay. One also could formulate the point as follows: There is 
no obvious reason why a voluntary reduction in ability to pay is not 
possible. Its being voluntary would defeat the claim that the 
taxpayer’s ability to pay has been reduced only if what made it 
voluntary, namely, the psychic benefit, is part of the tax base.
All of this said, there is an aspect of Kornhauser’s analysis that 
does seem to suggest that the power to determine who consumes 
wealth has value beyond the utility it affords the taxpayer. As she 
notes, in controlling the potential disposition of economic resources, 
the owner also exercises some control over others because resources 
are scarce.74 If it matters to B whether A may benefit B in some way 
(through gift or otherwise) with her resources, then A may exercise 
some control over B, even if A ultimately does not benefit B at all. 
Indeed, it could matter to B even if the only prospect in view is that 
A may enter into a lucrative contract with B or exercise her wealth-
derived influence in favor of B in some other way. In other words, 
possession of wealth confers a valuable power because the 
possession can affect the behavior of others in favor of the owner. 
Further, this power seems to be “real” in a way that the psychic 
benefit from giving (or consuming, for that matter) is not. It is not 
specifically the power to determine who consumes but more 
generally the power that comes with control over others through 
one’s own control over scarce resources.
Perhaps ironically, it seems that an inclusion–deduction regime 
for gifts would precisely tax this very power because it seems to be 
embodied in the discounted value of a deferred deduction for the gift. 
If the taxpayer accedes to wealth in the first period and gifts it in a 
later period, the inclusion–deduction regime will require immediate 
inclusion and a later deduction of lesser economic value than if the 
gift were made immediately. Suppose, for example, that the donor 
earns $100 in Year 1 and gives the donee $100 one year later, 
together with the interest that is earned on the after-tax amount. 
Assume further that the tax rate is a flat 20% and the discount rate is 
10%. The donor therefore pays $20 of tax in Year 1, leaving $80. In 
Year 2, the donor transfers $108 to the donee, of which $80 reflects 
the after-tax amount from Year 1, $20 is the tax benefit of the $100 
deduction, and $8 reflects the interest earned during Year 1 that is 
neither included nor deducted by the donor. (This treatment of the 
interest is equivalent to the donor’s including the $8, paying the tax 
74. See Kornhauser, supra note 5, at 32.
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on it, and then immediately giving the $8 and receiving an $8 
deduction, canceling the tax.) The donee has $108 of income. The 
overall effect to the donor is that she pays $20 in taxes in Year 1 and 
receives $20 back in Year 2. The donor ends up paying tax on the 
time value of holding the $100 for a year because the Year 1 value of 
the $20 tax reduction in Year 2 is just $18.18,75 resulting in a net real 
tax liability of $1.82 (in Year 1 dollars). In effect, the donor is taxed 
on the power to determine the identity of the consumer for the term 
during which she exercises the power.
In fact, taxation of the power to affect others really seems to be 
exemplified in the difference between an inclusion–deduction 
income tax regime and a cash-flow consumption tax as the two apply 
to gifts.76 Consider again the preceding example, but under a cash-
flow consumption tax (as understood under the real asset view). The 
donor would both include and immediately deduct the $100 on 
investment in Year 1. The $100 would earn $10 of interest during the 
year (not $8), and, taking the tax to apply only to actual preclusive 
use, would result in a non-taxed net transfer to the donee one year 
later of $110 rather than $108. As contrasted with the income tax 
version of the example, here no tax arises on the power to determine 
the identity of the consumer. The income tax includes an additional 
$1.82 in its base—the Year 1 dollar equivalent of the additional $2 
transferred to the donee in Year 2. Thus, the income tax and the 
consumption tax differ just in that the latter reaches only 
consumption while the former reaches the power to affect 
consumption as well as consumption itself.
B. Single Taxation
As stated previously, a number of commentators have argued 
that the income concept supports taxation of just one of the parties to 
the gift—either the donee or the donor. This Section examines the 
idea of income as supporting single taxation.
An explicitly welfarist conception of income would support 
taxation of both the donor and the donee if the goal were simply to 
tax utility, without regard to the incentive effects of the tax itself.77
For the reasons discussed in Section A, the grounds for concluding 
75. That is, $18.18 grows in one year at 10% to $20.
76. As against the point made above, one can argue that the power is taxed 
even under a consumption tax because the exercise of the power ultimately yields 
consumed benefits to the donor. See Shaviro, supra note 72, at 103-06.
77. See supra Section A.
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that the donor enjoys utility from the gift at least equal to its fair 
market value are overwhelming, while it seems reasonable to 
conclude, to a first approximation, that the donee enjoys utility equal 
to the fair market value of the gift given—certainly at least equal to
face value in the case of a cash gift.
If, however, one considers the tax on gifts in light of the 
incentive consequences of the tax and with a view to maximizing 
welfare, one might reach a different conclusion. As also explained 
previously, a distinctive feature of many gifts is that they produce 
utility in a way that is not commensurate with resources consumed.78
In the simplest case, if A gives B $100 in cash, A enjoys at least $100 
of utility, and so does B; if A instead consumes the money, only A
derives utility.79 A tax on gifts that reduces the after-tax value to the 
donee of the gift below the donor’s after-tax own-consumption value 
can result in failure of the gift and thereby in reduction of total utility 
by approximately the full (pre-tax) amount of the gift.80 Thus there 
may be good grounds under a welfarist view for taxing gifts quite 
lightly or even for subsidizing them. In any case, however, whether 
one settles on single taxation or double but light taxation (or even 
single taxation at a reduced rate or a subsidy), the question of how 
heavy the burden should be is an empirical one under a welfarist 
analysis because it depends on the elasticity of gifts to taxes. It is 
also one of policy because it depends as well on one’s view about the 
role of the tax system—whether it is to be part of a larger 
governmental program of maximizing utility or, more modestly, 
simply to withdraw private resources in a way that minimizes the 
disutility from doing so, assuming the pre-tax world operates as a 
baseline. Addressing these questions is beyond the scope of this 
Article. The point is that welfarist views have an ambiguous 
relationship to the tax on gifts.
The discussion below accordingly focuses on the single tax 
theory as applied to the classical income and fairness views of 
taxation. The general question is whether these views support 
78. See supra Section A. 
79. The discussion in the example ignores consumer surplus or the fact that 
an individual may value what is purchased or given more than its fair market value 
(face amount in the case of cash). See Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in 
Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 157, n.32 (1998) (defining consumer 
surplus).
80. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 284, for an exploration of the problem.
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taxation of the donee or the donor.81 I argue that there is no uniquely 
correct answer, just as in the case of the question whether a single or 
a double tax should apply to gifts; rather, one’s answer depends on a 
prior and for the most part unreviewable decision about the purpose 
of taxation. Again, it is unreviewable in the sense that it depends on 
one’s view about the nature and purpose of government, a topic that 
typically falls outside of most scholarly analyses of the income 
taxation of gifts.
1. Donee Taxation
Professor Andrews suggests, albeit with some reservation, that 
a real asset income tax would tax the donee and not the donor, at 
least in the absence of other, more pragmatic policy considerations.82
The theory is straightforward. The donee is the one who takes a 
portion of the pool out of which government spending will be 
financed.83 Treating the assets consumed as the stock out of which 
government spending occurs, the tax simply reaches a portion of that 
pool.84 Concomitantly, the donor lacks the resources once the gift is 
made; hence the tax should fall on the donee (by means of an 
inclusion–deduction regime) if one considers the base of the tax to be 
ability to pay as determined by the resources the taxpayer controls.
The principle for donee taxation under a real asset view seems 
straightforward enough in the case of a flat tax but more problematic 
if the tax is progressive, as most national income taxes are.85 As 
81. Another theoretically possible outcome is “single” taxation divided 
between donor and donee. Such a tax would be single in the sense that it would not 
exceed, in total, the tax either party would pay if that party had earned the gifted 
amount. This possibility does not seem to be a live option under a pure version of 
the classical income view, since that view tracks resources. As noted below, 
however, the economic (rather than legal) incidence of the tax may be divided 
between the donor and the donee in many cases. See infra note 94 and 
accompanying text.
82. See Andrews, supra note 4, at 348 (“Ideally, perhaps, the tax should be 
on the donee rather than the donor.”). Other considerations include the 
administrative problem of tracking gifts and the fact that reporting the value of gifts 
to donees may be inappropriate in some cases.
83. See id.
84. Kahn & Kahn develop this theory at some length in the course of their 
defense of donor-only taxation, which I discuss below. See Kahn & Kahn, supra
note 3, at 454-55.
85. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports 
that, as of 2016, 31 of 35 of its members (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and 
Hungary excepted) levied a personal income tax that features a progressive rate 
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noted, a common and plausible justification for progressive taxation 
is that higher-income individuals suffer less from bearing the same 
proportion of the costs of government than do lower-income 
individuals under the assumption of the declining marginal utility of 
money.86 If the assumption is correct, a high- and a low-income 
person may bear equal psychic burdens from taxes even if the tax 
rate on the high-income person is higher than the rate on the low-
income person.
Whatever its merits, when applied to the common gift case in 
which the donor is in a higher tax bracket than the donee, a 
deduction–inclusion regime for gifts seems to justify tax avoidance. 
If the objects of their bounty are in lower tax brackets, then through 
gifts donors can electively reduce the combined tax burden of the 
donor and donee and subvert the progressive rate structure.87 The 
result seems to be problematic for the version of the real asset view 
that would seek to tax the donee only.88 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
expressly disallowed this method of tax reduction in a similar setting 
in the early case of Lucas v. Earl, where the Court held that the 
taxpayer’s contractual assignment of one-half of his income to his 
wife was ineffective to prevent the income from being taxed to him 
rather than her, even though the assignment seems not to have been 
tax-motivated.89
In order to see why the prospect of joint donor-donee reduction does 
not defeat the donee-only tax view, it is important to keep in mind 
the basis for concern with this kind of elective tax reduction. It may 
be true that a deduction/inclusion regime for gifts would subvert the 
progressive structure of the tax, but the question is whether a 
progressive rate structure is consistent with the real asset theory of 
income in the first place, not with whether donee-only taxation 
should be disallowed under a progressive structure.90
structure. See Table I.1: Central Government Personal Income Tax Rates and 
Thresholds, OECD.STAT, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=
TABLE_I1 [https://perma.cc/X4LX-7JNJ] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
86. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 17, at 472.
87. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 474.
88. See id. at 475 (arguing that this problem makes a deduction–inclusion 
regime unworkable under a progressive rate structure).
89. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The parties entered into the contract in 1901, some 
twelve years before passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. Id. at 113. Joint filing was 
unavailable for the years in issue.
90. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 474-75. Kahn & Kahn note the 
adverse incentives that a deduction–inclusion regime creates under a progressive tax 
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If it is not, then all that follows is that some other principle or 
principles dictate denial of a deduction, in whole or part, to the 
donor, not that the real asset view supports donor taxation after all.
Many arguments might be advanced to support a progressive 
rate structure,91 but what they have in common is the idea that 
accessions are a proxy for the thing we wish to tax, rather than the 
thing itself.92 If that were not the case, if accessions were the very 
thing we wanted to tax, then a flat tax would be appropriate, perhaps 
by definition. In that case, the transfer of resources from A to B
would not reflect the retention or creation by A of anything that one 
would believe should be in the tax base, and the shift in tax liability 
would be unobjectionable. By contrast, under a progressive structure, 
we know that accessions are not the very thing we wish to tax 
because the amount of tax due depends on something other than 
change in wealth: The quality of the income that makes it attractive 
to tax varies with its quantity. Thus there is something about the 
quantity that affects its quality, and it is that quality, and not the 
income, that is the thing we wish to tax.
What is the quality? As indicated above, the most commonly 
offered justification for progressive taxation is the declining 
marginal utility of money or the idea that equal sacrifice demands 
larger proportional dollar sacrifices from the better-off.93 Another
possible justification is that progressive rates represent a compromise 
between ensuring equal material welfare for each individual and 
maintaining adequate incentives for higher wage-rate persons to 
continue working and for wealthier taxpayers to save.94 Under this 
view, rates should be progressive as long as the loss in total welfare 
due to declining work and saving incentives is less than the gain in 
welfare from redistributing societal resources, which is done (in part) 
by means of a progressive tax.95 Yet a third possible view is that 
and conclude that the tax should be on the donor for that reason (among others). Id. 
at 474.
91. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 17, at 452-86 (discussing arguments for 
and against progressivity in income taxation).
92. Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity 
Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 163 (1997).
93. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 17, at 457.
94. Identifying the tax schedule that maximizes welfare given the 
disincentive that taxes create to supply additional labor and the fact that wage rate is 
generally unobservable is the main subject of the optimal tax literature. See James 
A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 175, 179 (1971).
95. See id. at 175.
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wealth concentration in relatively few hands constitutes a power that 
ought to be taxed (as previously discussed). Whatever the 
justification, it seems the shifting of tax liability from donor to donee 
is inconsistent with the principle of progression in rates. 
Nevertheless, the untoward avoidance aspect of shifting the tax 
derives from the fact that progression seeks to tax something other 
than economic power itself, and that thing goes untaxed in the gift 
case. It does not derive from an asserted inconsistency of donee-only 
taxation with the real asset view.
As an illustration, consider the case in which the principle of 
equal proportional sacrifice underlies progression in rates. The idea 
is that each person should pay the same percentage of her total 
psychic welfare or utility to fund the government, and the psychic 
cost is thought to be a declining function of market resources.96 (Or, 
in a more refined version, what is to be equally shared is the 
proportion of psychic welfare derived from government-provided 
services.) At this point, the relevance of utility or psychic welfare to 
the proper tax treatment of gifts becomes explicit. The high-bracket 
donor plainly derives utility or psychic benefit from the gift at least 
equal to its market value to her. We therefore know that her total 
utility after the gift is at least equal to what it was beforehand, so that 
(at least) the same higher rate should apply after the gift as before. In 
contrast to a real asset tax base, the base here is welfare as 
determined by, but not the same as, market resources. Therefore it 
makes sense to levy some tax on the donor even if the donee also is 
taxed: She has as much utility as before, and the principle of the tax 
is in fact utility (or, more accurately, relative disutility). The basis for 
taxing the donor is that progression indicates that at least a criterion 
of tax liability is welfare; the very thing we wish to tax is not control 
over material resources. Thus, progressivity in rates seems to point to 
some theory of income as psychic benefit that may support taxation 
of both donor and donee, which is the effect of progression on the 
(higher-bracket) donor. Note that this may in fact be a version of the 
regime we have, which nominally taxes the donor only. In particular, 
under the current regime, if the donor adjusts the size of the gift by 
the deduction that would be made available under explicit donee 
96. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 17, at 472-80 (discussing and 
criticizing the equal sacrifice principle—the issue here is not its cogency but what 
follows for the taxation of gifts if it applies).
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taxation, the donee in effect bears the tax at the donor’s marginal 
rate.97
2. Donor Taxation
Professors Douglas Kahn and Jeffrey Kahn (Kahn & Kahn) 
argue for a single, donor-level tax (through non-deduction for the 
gift) under a version of the real asset view.98 This Subsection uses 
their analysis to highlight that the choice of taxpayer, like the 
question of whether the tax is single or double, ultimately depends 
on a prior decision about what one thinks should be in the base and 
what one thinks should not.
Kahn & Kahn tie the tax on the donor to their conception of the 
specific nature of an income tax as opposed to a consumption tax.99
According to them, whereas a consumption base reaches preclusive 
personal use, “the payment of an income tax purchases the right to 
have the taxed income used by the taxpayer, or by someone else of 
the taxpayer’s choosing, to acquire and consume societal goods or 
services.”100
As contrasted with a consumption tax, which they agree would 
support taxation of the donee but not of the donor, an income tax 
reaches accumulated income and for this reason requires taxation of 
the donor only. According to Kahn & Kahn, the reason that a tax on 
accumulated income confers rights both to consume and to determine 
who consumes goods is that the Haig-Simons definition of income 
“subsumes an assumption that the accumulated wealth will be spent 
on consumption in some future year and that the amount of the 
income currently accumulated provides a fair approximation of the 
present value of the future consumption.”101 Accordingly, income is 
taxed on accumulation because it
represents the present value of the consumption that presumably will take 
place at some future date. In other words, an income tax differs from a 
consumption tax in that the income tax imposes a tax currently on the 
97. As an example, suppose the donor is in the 30% bracket and the donee 
in the 10% bracket. If the donor would give $100 under a deduction/inclusion 
regime but gives $70 instead, the donee effectively pays an extra $20 tax.
98. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 465-66.
99. Id. at 460.
100. See id. at 444.
101. See id. at 459.
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present value of future consumption instead of waiting until the future 
consumption takes place and taxing it then.102
In effect, Kahn & Kahn’s idea is that an income tax is a prepaid 
tax on resources (relative to the time of consumption), and therefore 
once the tax is paid, the associated consumption is covered, whether 
it is by the earner or by someone of the earner’s choosing, and 
whether it takes place immediately or later on.103 A consumption tax, 
by contrast, occurs on consumption itself.
Kahn & Kahn acknowledge that one could take the opposing 
position under an income tax that donee taxation is preferable to 
donor taxation.104 The basis for doing so would be that donee 
taxation would more accurately measure the affected individuals’ 
relative ability to bear the costs of government.105 Their point, 
however, is that because both positions further values that Congress 
might want to promote under an income tax, Congress reasonably 
can choose either one given that they conflict.106 Nevertheless, if 
their claim is to be more than a purely descriptive one about how the 
income tax can (and in fact does) apply to gifts, the position Kahn & 
Kahn advocate must be grounded in some normative theory. It must 
do more than describe the operation of the tax (or of a possible one). 
Perhaps more to the point, their argument still raises the question 
whether there is an internal logic to the economic accumulation 
theory such that taxing the donor but not the donee rests on more 
than a simple decision to define “income” such that only the donor 
has it.
Kahn & Kahn’s argument in support of donor taxation appears 
to relate to what they regard as the conceptual source of an income 
tax.107 In a simpler economy, they note, the government would not 
need to tax individuals on their money income; instead, it could 
simply take a portion of wealth that is produced at the source, since 
actually produced resources are what the government ultimately uses 
in its activity.108 This would be a simple form of income taxation and 
would, according to Kahn & Kahn, furnish the government with 
102. Id. at 455.
103. See id. at 453-54 (“The taxation of income is effectively a tax on current 
consumption plus a tax on future consumption that will be enjoyed by the taxpayer 
or by someone else.”).
104. See id. at 443.
105. See id. at 468.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 443.
108. See id. at 454.
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necessary resources so that no further taxation on income or 
consumption would be necessary.109 Gifts under such a regime would 
be taxable to the donor—in that the government would take its cut up 
front, before any gift were made—but not to the donee—in that the 
government’s tax role would be complete upon taxation at source.110
Kahn & Kahn then observe that in a more complex economy, 
taxation at the source is not feasible, and, as a consequence, the 
government must institute a personal income tax along the lines of 
the tax we currently have.111 Nevertheless, the essence of the two 
taxes is assertedly the same: a tax on accumulation—that is, when 
wealth is produced—with no further tax where no additional wealth 
is created—or at least with no further tax when the accession comes 
by means of gift rather than through some other mechanism. 
Therefore, since the first tax would be a true income tax and would 
be completed when the resource was produced, so should the income 
tax that we actually have. By contrast, a tax on wealth imposed at the 
time of preclusive use is a consumption tax and, indeed, expresses 
the difference, in their view, between the two bases.112
There are at least two difficulties with this argument, both of 
which boil down to the fact that their definition of income, like those 
examined before, appears to be stipulative. It is true that if the term 
“income” means economic accumulation, or perhaps more broadly 
receipts derived from economic activity, then a tax on the donor but 
not the donee is in order, as there is no accumulation or even 
ancillary economic production in a gift; material wealth is merely 
shifted for no commercial purpose. Kahn & Kahn, however, do not 
offer a conceptual argument for their definition. The observation 
about the nature of a simple income tax as a tax paid at the source in 
kind is merely descriptive of a possible tax. It does not demonstrate 
that such a tax is essentially a tax on income or even that it is more 
essentially an income tax than is an accessions tax. Instead, it is at 
most a thought experiment about a possible simple form of income 
taxation that implements a tax-on-accumulation principle. The 
question, however, is why the tax should implement that principle 
rather than an accessions principle (or some other principle). Thus 
one could equally say that an income tax is in essence an accessions 
tax, regardless of the reason for the accession, so that a pure version 
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 453.
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of the tax would apply at the source (accumulation being an instance 
of accession) but also provide a deduction (and inclusion) on transfer 
(a gift being an instance of de-accession for the donor and accession 
for the donee). The only difference is that the second version is 
harder to administer—a difference that does not appear to serve as a 
basis for concluding the first version is normatively correct (rather 
than just administratively simpler). Extending the point, one might 
equally say that the difficulty arises not with the more complex 
economy, in which money rather than accumulation at the source is 
taxed, but with the more rudimentary administrative apparatus in the 
simple economy, in which it is not feasible to keep track of de-
accessions. Neither observation by itself, however, says which 
version (if either) is normatively correct.
Kahn & Kahn’s second argument relates to their assertion that 
an income tax, but not a consumption tax, reaches the present value 
of future consumption.113 This is an accurate description of the tax if 
no deduction is provided on a gift, but that is precisely the 
question—whether a deduction should be provided on a gift. Why, 
then, is the description somehow correct as applied to gifts? The 
answer seems to be that at least a cash-flow version of a 
consumption tax applies on actual consumption, whereas an income 
tax does not await consumption; it reaches accumulation regardless 
of whether consumption occurs at the time of accumulation or later. 
Nevertheless, it would only follow that there should be no shifting of 
the income tax to the donee on a gift if the gift were itself a form of 
consumption; otherwise, the fact of tax on accumulation of amounts 
only later consumed has literally no implication for the tax treatment 
of the gift. Kahn & Kahn themselves, however, state just the 
opposite about the nature of gifts: They assert (correctly, in my view) 
that a gift is not a form of consumption.114 Instead, they agree with 
Professor Alvin Warren’s definition of consumption as “the ultimate 
use or destruction of economic resources.”115 Once they concede that 
making a gift is not an act of consumption, the fact that an income 
tax reaches deferred consumption on prior accumulation has no 
bearing on the tax treatment of gifts.116 At that point, it becomes 
113. See id. at 455.
114. See id. at 461.
115. Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Warren, supra 
note 9, at 1084).
116. See id. at 462 (“[W]hen X makes a gift to his son, X has not consumed 
any of society’s resources by making that transfer.”). In another article, Professor 
Douglas Kahn states that the enjoyment a donor derives from a gift does not count 
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unclear why an income tax should be defined as one that applies on 
accumulation rather than on accession. There is no reason why an 
income tax could not be defined as a tax that applies to the present 
value of future consumption by the person who consumes the wealth, 
rather than by the one who first accumulates it. Under the former 
definition, a true income tax would provide a deduction to the donor 
and inclusion by the donee.117
The point of these observations is not to defend an accessions 
tax as somehow a “true” income tax under the real asset view. Rather 
it is to show that a preference for an accumulations base or for an
accessions base, if not itself grounded in some normative theory, is 
just that: a preference that has no normative force. As noted, Kahn & 
Kahn claim their argument is merely that either definition could 
serve for an income tax and not that the tax ought to be on 
accumulations. But it seems they also intend their argument to be 
more than merely a claim that one could define income as 
accumulation rather than as accession. Instead it seems they consider 
the income tax concept to differ from the consumption tax concept 
just in that the income tax concept is a form of prepaid tax on 
consumption.
CONCLUSION
How should gifts be treated under an income tax? The main 
point of this Article is that the answer must be: “It depends.” 
Specifically, it depends on one’s view of the nature of social 
organization and, consequently, about the role (if any) of an income 
tax in supporting any particular such view. Secondly, it depends on 
the consistent application of whatever principles follow for an 
income tax from whatever view one does have.
If, as is often the case, the first topic is not engaged, one can 
derive no final answer to the question of the proper treatment of gifts 
under the tax. The most one can realistically hope for is consistency 
between the proponent’s normative first principles and the associated 
as consumption. Douglas A. Kahn, The Taxation of a Gift or Inheritance from an 
Employer, 64 TAX L. 273, 277 (2011). “The psychic pleasures that a donor acquires 
from making a gift do not involve the consumption of any item or service because 
no societal good or service has been used up.” Id. 
117. A further point that Kahn & Kahn make relates to the fact that a tax on 
the donee subverts progressivity. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 3, at 474. This issue 
is addressed in the previous Subsection. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying 
text.
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rules for the income taxation of gifts. For instance, if one adopts a 
real asset view of income taxation, it seems that the proper rule for 
gifts is a single tax, while a welfarist approach would seem to favor a 
rule that might tax one or both parties, or might more lightly tax gifts 
than other transactions, based on a study of the actual incentive 
effects that various possible regimes create and their effects on total 
welfare. Within the single-tax view, it would appear that an 
accumulation view of the income tax, namely that it is a tax on 
productive economic activity, would support donor-only taxation, 
while an accessions view of the tax would support donee-only 
taxation. Neither version of the real asset view seems to support 
progressivity in taxation, since each of them seems to subscribe to 
the idea that income is the thing we wish to tax.
A second implication of the analysis is that consistency in 
application of whatever principle one favors may have unexpected 
consequences. If one believes, for example, that the tax system ought 
to be progressive, one may find it hard to make a principled case for 
omitting from consideration the welfare effects of a whole array of 
tax rules on the basis that welfare effects involve psychic rather than 
real income or loss. By its nature, progressivity seems to rely on the 
propriety of taxing psychic benefits. Thus it could be hard to insist 
on, for example, a double-tax regime for gifts while also maintaining 
the idea that the income tax generally ought to be based on 
ownership of material resources, or that no account should be made 
for the psychic cost of producing income. While there might be 
administrative or other grounds for limiting the tax so as not to 
include psychic costs or benefits, the substantive policy basis for 
doing so would need some explication.
A third implication is that the same lesson drawn here for the 
question of how to tax gifts applies to other debates that veer into 
questions of basic social policy. An effort to tax “income” will not 
dictate whether, for example, allocating tax burdens by income is 
finally fair or not because the concept of income does not adequately 
specify what, in the final analysis, would be relevant for determining 
what counts as fair. Rather a conception of fairness, together with 
other more practical considerations, shapes what should and should 
not count as income. The same goes for the use of consumption, 
wealth, or other bases as normative principles. These concepts may 
be enormously helpful in answering practical questions within the 
framework of already-accepted principles, but they will not tell us 
whether those already-accepted principles are correct.
